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Introduction
The right to asylum is a central theme in South American political identity. What
originated as a way of  protecting political leaders in the period of  anarchy that
followed the independence of  these nations became, in the 1940s, a cornerstone
of  the inter-American political and legal systems. For the first century and a half
of  national independence in South American countries, the right to asylum was
an elite status that guaranteed protection to political leaders deposed by political
unrest or fearful of  political retribution. These political elites usually sought asy-
lum in neighboring countries: far enough from home for safety, but close
enough to continue to participate in the political life of  their country. In this
sense, the cases of  Sarmiento in the 1830s and 1840s and Haya de la Torre in
the 1940s are quintessential examples of  pre-1960s exile, asylum and the role of
exile in Latin American political life.2
This elite idea of  refuge violently ceased to exist in the Southern Cone
of  America in the 1960s.3 The rise of  a new type of  authoritarian and military
government changed the characteristics of  asylum and exile. This new form of
political exile included not only elites but also myriad political activists and com-
mon citizens. Exile in the Southern Cone during the authoritarian-bureaucratic
regimes of  the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, followed several paths and those who
suffered came from different walks of  life. There were those directly expelled
from their countries by their governments, those who sought asylum in an
embassy, and those who left by their own means after realizing that they would
not be able to find means of  subsistence due to their political ideas.4 In terms of
class and social position, they were state employees, academics, artists, and blue
collars workers; they were either leaders in their political parties or sympathizers.
They came from all regions of  their countries. Once abroad, these exiles worked
to build a life in their countries of  reception, without abandoning the dream of
returning as soon as possible to their countries of  origin. Many of  them also
actively participated from abroad in opposition to the dictatorial governments in
their countries. This process was not easy; they were hurt and defeated. Some of
them had been tortured; their friends killed or disappeared, while they continu-
ously asked themselves why they were still alive.
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These processes generated several unintended consequences. Mainly,
exile served to coalesce a solidarity movement abroad that helped end dictator-
ships at home. In this article, however, I will examine two unintended conse-
quences of  Brazilian and Chilean exiles that have helped redefine the politics of
the left and the center left in these countries in the last thirty years. In the case
of  Brazil I will deal with the realization of  their own Latin American identity
and in the case of  Chile the renovation of  the left which helped construct the
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, the conglomerate of  left and center par-
ties that defeated Pinochet and stayed in power, democratically elected, for 20
years.
Using autobiographies and personal narratives of  exiles, I examine
these two unintended consequences of  exile and the effects that it had in the
countries of  origin. In the following pages I first describe the current literature
of  exile in Brazil and Chile. I then locate the process of  exile in the 1960s
onwards as the result of  a particular type of  military government, which created
massive human rights abuses. Then, through the voices of  those who experi-
enced it, I present the case of  Brazil and the discovery of  a Latin American
identity followed by the case of  Chile and the role of  exile in the renovation of
the left. I conclude this article by comparing these two processes, the Brazilian
and the Chilean, and their effects on post-authoritarian governments. I state the
need for further comparative analysis of  exiles based on their multiple effects.
Based on this analysis, I argue as well that it is time to re-evaluate the place of
exile as a form of  human rights abuse.
The Literature of  Exile
The process of  political exile in Brazil that began in 1964 is strongly connected
to the Chilean exile that started in 1973. A large number of  Brazilian exiles lived
in Chile between 1964 and 1973. Some of  them taught at Chilean universities
(Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for example), or worked in high positions in the
Chilean government (as Paulo Freire did). Many Brazilians had been involved in
these political processes of  change in their country of  origin; a number of  them
participated as well in the revolutionary social movements that were changing
Chile at the time. For Brazilian exiles in Chile, the military coup in Chile repre-
sented the need for a second exile. In turn, Chilean politicians and other citizens
forced to flee Chile learned from Brazilian exiles what it meant to be an exile.5
Although there is a vast literature on the violations of  human rights
during the period of  military dictatorships, this literature has centered mostly on
the desaparecidos and on torture. Only recently has a systematic reference to exile
emerged. As Loreto Rebolledo has argued in the case of  Chile:
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…exile was a relevant theme that was part of  the political discus-
sion during the dictatorship, the demands to lift the ban on the
return of  the exiles was constantly presented by human rights
lawyers, by the churches and La Vicaría de la Solidaridad. However
once every exile was allowed to return to the country this topic
became forgotten as a human rights violation.6
This still limited, albeit growing, historiography and scholarship of  the process
of  exile in both countries can be traced to two main sources. The first source is
in the arts. There is a vast literature and cinema that deals with exile, which origi-
nated very early in the process. Raúl Ruiz, for example, directed one of  the first
movies that dealt with this topic from the Chilean perspective in 1975 in France.
The movie, titled Dialogue of  Exiles, deals with the lives of  Chilean exiles in
France shortly after the coup of  1973.7 Filmed using mostly exiles who had
never acted, the movie centers around discussions about everyday life, the idea
of  defeat, and the possibility of  a short exile. Literature has shown a growing
concern with the topic, particularly from authors who were exiles themselves.
These authors have also dealt with the return to their countries after the end of
the dictatorships. Examples include José Donoso and Carlos Cerda in Chile and
Mario Benedetti in Uruguay, among many others.8
The second source is composed of  rich life histories and memoirs from
well-known politicians and common citizens.9 Most of  these biographical
accounts provide a perspective on individual suffering in exile, and while the
authors locate themselves at the intersection of  history and biography, in most
cases they lack analysis of  more macro impacts of  exile. From a perspective of
large-scale national histories and their historians, the process of  exile and life
experiences of  exiles have been forgotten and hidden. Also, because the study of
exile yields unpleasant truths about the past, it has not been well received in soci-
eties in the process of  reconciliation.10 For many in the country of  origin, exiles
were thought of  as a group that had it easier, since they were living in a different
country and did not suffer everyday repression.11 However, as historical and
sociological research has illustrated, exile is not an experience apart from the
nation; instead, the personal and social experiences of  exile and national oppres-
sion are inextricably linked.12 By contributing an everyday perspective, biogra-
phies and individual personal narratives and histories/stories of  exile are key to
understanding this period, since they humanize the fears, dangers, failures and
successes of  those who were compelled to leave.
Most recently, a new generation of  scholarship on exile attempts to
provide interdisciplinary, macro explanations of  the process of  exile using per-
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sonal narratives, governmental documents and archives, as well as other
sources.13 In general terms this has been true for all of  the Southern Cone.14
This second generation of  studies has attempted to shed light on the macro
impacts of  the process. We are in the presence of  works whose voice is that of
the collective and not only the individual memory, as well as works that explain
the role of  exile in economic, social, and political change in the countries of  ori-
gin.15 Still, much essential work is still lacking: the process of  recuperating the
memory of  exile, its impacts on countries of  origin and reception, the process of
return, and above all its location within the human rights abuses of  the Southern
Cone dictatorships of  the second half  of  the Twentieth century, as well as com-
parative analyses that deal with the multiple realities of  exiles and the multiple
South American nations that have suffered from this experience.16 These analy-
ses are of  utmost importance to the construction of  future societies in both
countries and to the reconstruction of  nations that have suffered political and
social traumas.
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes and Exiles
The United States’ role in the political processes that led to the military coups in
South America is well documented.17 In general terms, the objective of  the
United States in these countries was to block leftist parties from the government
in order to avoid a second Cuba, and thus to oppose the advance of  global
socialism. In particular, the participation of  the United States took the form of
three major actions: financing development projects through the Alliance for
Progress, funding of  center and right wing political parties as a way of  prevent-
ing the left from gaining and maintaining the presidency, and training military
officers who became the leaders of  military coups and insurrections.18 Military
support through educational exchange between military schools and equipment
sales, for example, had been permanent since the nineteenth-century but
increased from the 1950s onwards with the creation of  the School of  the
Americas.19 Although the impact of  this program was not the same in every
Latin American country, its objective was to train officers from the armies of
these countries in counter-insurgency, antiterrorism, and anticommunist ideolo-
gies. This indoctrination had deep consequences for both Chile and Brazil since
several of  the School’s alumni went on to head the secret police of  the military
governments and other intelligence organizations of  a repressive nature. The
School of  the Americas was much more successful in preventing the rise of
social and military leftist revolutions than the Alliance for Progress, which con-
sisted of  economic aid, tied aid in most cases, for the development of  rural areas
of  Latin America.20
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The dictatorships that rose to power in the Southern Cone, beginning
with the Brazilian in 1964, were able to succeed because of  a particular number
of  objective conditions. First, they emerged in the more industrialized Latin
American societies. Second, they were characterized by an institutionalized mili-
tary rule. Third, these dictatorships had a “historical project” through which they
attempted to transform their societies as a whole, in their social, economic, cul-
tural, and political characteristics.21 This explains their duration and the reason
that, unlike previous military regimes such as Chile in 1924, militaries did not
transfer power back to civilians soon after the coup. Fourth, they were supported
by a group of  trans-nationalized technocrats who followed an ideology that
linked national security and economic development. Finally, the rise of  these
regimes was in part a product of  the internationalizing of  U.S. security doctrines
through foreign police and military assistance since the 1950s.22
These dictatorships are what Guillermo O’Donell and others named
Bureaucratic- Authoritarian Regimes.23 These authors use a systemic or structur-
al approach to understand these processes of  political change and the reason
behind the high levels of  violence. For O’Donnell and Garretón, the military
governments in power in the Southern Cone felt that they had to fulfill a specific
historical project: to free their countries from Marxism and moral decadence.
Because of  this, the members of  the ruling juntas were always comparing them-
selves with the founding fathers and liberators of  these nations.24 These new
dictatorships were qualitatively different from those that had come before. They
put into action a military structure that sought to change the political culture and
the system of  government, thus creating what O’Donnell termed a bureaucratic-
authoritarian regime.25
This concept is intended to characterize a state that has the following
characteristics. First, individuals who have completed successful careers in highly
bureaucratized and complex organizations, such as the army or big companies,
usually occupy the higher echelons of  government. Second, these are systems of
political exclusion; they attempt to limit access to the state to the popular sector
and its political allies. Third, these are also systems of  economic exclusion; they
reduce and postpone to an unspecified future the economic aspirations of  the
popular classes. Fourth, these regimes attempt to break the political requirements
of  civil society. To achieve this, they reduce social questions and public policies
to technical problems that have to be solved through arrangements in the higher
echelons of  state organizations. Finally, these regimes correspond to a stage of
profound transformations in the processes of  accumulation in their societies, a
stage that takes part in consolidation of  a peripheral industrial capitalism.26
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The rise of  these regimes is a response to fast processes of  mass mobi-
lization and political consciousness among the popular classes. This is perceived
by other sectors of  the population as a threat to the continuation of  defined
socio-economic structures, which eventually ends in the dominant sector impos-
ing this regime using the armed forces as the moral reserve of  societies.
Besides being regimes of  torture, disappearance and murder, these dic-
tatorships were also responsible for the largest politically and economically
induced exile process in the history of  the continent. The estimates of  this exile
are as high as half  a million Uruguayans (from a total of  2.9 million at mid-year
1980), between 400,000 and 600,000 Chileans (of  a population of  around 11
million in 1980), between 500,000 and 2 million Argentineans (of  a population
of  28 million in 1980) and from 5,000 to 15,000 Brazilians, all of  whom had to
leave their country during military rule.27 A significant number of  these exiles
never returned to their countries of  origin.28
The physical expulsion of  those against the regimes was a central com-
ponent of  the politics of  fear and destruction of  the opposition. It allowed the
regimes to present those who were against the dictatorships as traitors to their
nation and to their own ideals. The propaganda of  the dictatorships published
accounts in which they presented the exiles as people living the golden life in
Europe or other countries, or told how they had escaped prison while other
members of  their parties were tortured and left behind.29 An example of  this, in
the case of  Brazil, is the regime’s slogan: Brasil: Ame-o ou Deixe-o! (Brazil, love it
or leave it!). In the words of  Santos and Rolland:
This slogan efficiently characterizes the years of  dictatorship in
Brazil … Exile is necessarily an instrumental mechanism, used to
varying degrees by authoritarian governments. The real and sup-
posed opponents are declared illegitimate, who must at best be
silenced, or they will end up in jail ... in the best case.30
The particular characteristics of  these new dictatorships are behind the
high levels of  violence they used to produce fear in their population. Exile was
one of  the means used to continue producing fear. As we will see below, the
results were not necessarily those expected by the military in power.
The Brazilian case: The discovery of  a Latin American identity
The military coup that deposed João Goulart in 1964 was the preface to what
would happen in most of  South America in the following years.31 Even the
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rationale behind the need for a military coup, the beginnings of  the coup, and
the ensuing dictatorship were similar. On the one hand, a progressive govern-
ment that followed either socialist, leftist, or liberation theology ideas; and on the
other, the conservative owners of  business and haciendas and right wing parties
supported by the United States. 
The Brazilian coup, according to Rabêlo & Rabêlo, originated in a polit-
ical and social crisis that was seen by right wing politicians and the military as a
threat that could end in a socialist or communist revolutionary process.32
Goulart tried to nationalize the electrical companies and created a state-owned
enterprise to regulate nuclear power, a recent development in Brazil. This was
not well received by the owners of  the service companies, who in return began
supporting a movement that lead to the military coup. According to Cardoso:
“[W]hat happened in April 1964 was not just a coup, it was a profound clash in
Brazilian society. The elite classes felt the experiment with democracy had failed
… The ensuing ‘reorganization’ did not destroy merely people, but entire seg-
ments of  society.”33
The repression in Brazil at the beginning of  the military government
was not as hard as it would soon be in the rest of  the Southern Cone countries.
During the first days following the coup, only those with strong political partici-
pation were asked to present themselves at police stations and detained, and only
those that had a relevant position in the government asked for diplomatic asy-
lum. Torture also was not a common trend among those imprisoned.34 As men-
tioned before, this was different from what would happen in Chile, where a large
number of  people asked for diplomatic asylum in the first days of  the coup,
partly due to the observed experience of  Brazil.
The low level of  repression would change after 1968. Two key things
happened in that year. First, groups of  students, mostly coming from the
Brazilian elites, began revolutionary movements to destabilize the military gov-
ernments. These groups attempted two strategies to gain public favor: bank rob-
beries to access monetary resources that would allow them to undertake other
activities, and kidnapping of  foreign ambassadors according to their relevance in
trade relations between Brazil and the country of  origin. Although this strategy
was not successful, and after a few months the guerrilla movements 
had been completely disarticulated, it succeeded in exchanging the captives for
political prisoners, which led to both an increase in the number of  exiles and a
change in the characteristics of  the exiles. 
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Second, in part as a response to these urban guerrilla movements, was
the passing of  the Institutional Act Number 5, which marked the triumph of  the
“hard-liners” within the dictatorship, and the systematization of  murders, deten-
tion and torture of  those opposed to the regime.35 If  those who had left the
country in the early days of  the coup were center and center-left elites, including
João Goulart himself, those that left after 1968 were mainly younger Marxist
activists and were not directly related to the older political or intellectual elite.36
In the words of  Sznajder and Roniger, “[W]hereas the goal of  those in the first
wave [1964] was to redress the end of  democracy and defend reformism, for
those in the ‘1968 wave,’ the central goal was revolution.”37
The first two notable themes that emerge from the personal accounts
and memoirs of  the exiles are questioning of  the defeat and certainty of  a near-
term return.38 This will be the same in the Chilean case. The first group of
exiles continuously questioned and debated the reasons behind the defeat. This
question, which was mainly a private matter and not a public activity, resonated
through conversations between former politicians and other supporters of
Goulart’s government. 39 Beatriz Bandeira Ryff  remembers that as she was leav-
ing Brazil in route to exile in Yugoslavia: 
Small groups joined in interminable conversations about politics,
the recent and current occurrences whose analysis took a long time.
These discussions were heated, passionate, and filled with remem-
brances and anecdotes, but always very peaceful.40
Ana Montenegro reflects that exiles carry a dual baggage, one that is
political and emotional at the same time; it is a conversation also with the exile’s
ghosts and the continuous attempt to do a cold analysis of  the factors that lead
to this situation.41 Even after a decade, in 1974, when all of  the Southern Cone
but Argentina was under the rule of  dictatorships, Montenegro remembers
meeting with friends for dinner and asking themselves how and why Latin
America did not learn the Brazilian lesson.
The certainty of  near-term return, that condition which kept many
exiles living literally with their suitcases packed, was based on a memory or expe-
rience of  previous military governments.42 According to this memory, the 1964
military governments would be short-lived and benign; as had happened before,
exiles assumed that after a couple of  years the military dictatorship would end
and all exiles would be able to return to their countries. Cardoso, in his memoirs,
recollects the following discussion: “My friend Celso Furtado leaned across the
table trying to comfort him. ‘Don’t worry’, Celso said. ‘The dictatorship will last
Doña-Reveco16
Quark 16_2_Left History.qxd  2012-12-21  12:50 AM  Page 16
two years at most.’ Wainer looked up at Celso, indignant. ‘There is no way the
military would hold to power that long!’ he declared.”43 The attributes of  the
bureaucratic-authoritarian regime defined above, particularly its clear and specific
ideology, allowed the military to remain in power for the following 21 years.
A second important situation that arises from the narratives and biogra-
phies is the discovery of  a shared Latin American origin among (at least) those
Brazilians exiled in Chile, Bolivia and Mexico.44 Until the 1980s Brazil had a dual
relationship with Latin America. On the one hand it belonged and participated
in all the hemispheric international organizations. On the other it had an active
but distant bilateralism with other Latin American nations.45 Its past experience
as an empire, its use of  a distinct language and its own hegemonic ambitions
separated Brazil from the rest of  the continent. This relationship was mutual; the
Latin American countries did not generally consider Brazil one of  their own.46
José Maria Rabêlo, a Brazilian who lived as an exile in Bolivia, Chile,
and France with his wife and seven children, remembers that it was soon after
his arrival in Bolivia that he first ‘discovered’ Hispanic America. He argues that
Brazilians did not originally think of  themselves as Latin Americans. For them,
Brazil was superior to the rest of  the continent, “even with a colonial perspec-
tive, as if  Brazil was that different from them”.47 He mentions that in Bolivia he
came to realize that the university traditions were older than in Brazil, that the
culture was more complex, and that it was closely tied to the presence of
respected indigenous values and the struggles for resistance. These characteristics
of  Bolivia, he argues, were seen in Brazil as a caricature, something ‘folkloric’,
transmitted by the colonizers. Later, during his exile in Chile, this Latin
Americanism was reinforced by the presence of  exiles from the entire continent,
who “gave us an idea of  the realities of  each of  their countries” and concludes
by stating that: “These discoveries produced a special feeling in us with regards
to the cultural, political, economic and social complexity of  the other side of
Latin America. When we left Brazil we thought that we were going to teach;
soon we realized that we had much to learn.”48
Fernando Henrique Cardoso makes a similar argument. He argues that
while he did not leave Brazil for intellectual reasons, he intellectually discovered
Latin America in Chile through contact with scholars from all of  Latin America.
It is this connection with other Latin American scholars that influences his work
with Enzo Faletto and the publication of  Dependency and Development in Latin
America, arguably one of  the most relevant social science theories produced in
Latin America.49
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The discovery of  this Latin American identity was not only at the level
of  intellectuals but also at the level of  shared political and social struggles. In
this sense Montenegro states that “most of  the exiles who arrived in Mexico and
other Latin American countries would find themselves for the first time among
‘Latin-American brothers’ … these exiles would discover America, five centuries
after it was discovered”.50 The similarity between the political processes experi-
enced by Brazil and the countries of  the Southern Cone amazed the Brazilian
exiles and led them to recognize that they were part of  Latin America as well. In
the same vein Darcy Ribeiro, quoted by Pinheiro Machado recalls:
The exile was a necessary process for us to comprehend that we
belong to a general category of  peoples with a common destiny.
Since we arose as peoples within the same circumstances and we
have a parallel destiny … [The process of  colonization] is a process
of  the Americas in general, which suffered a strong, hard occupa-
tion, having as a result the most homogenous area of  the Earth. We
have a unity of  past and future destiny.51
Finally Montenegro concludes that:
The process of  exile allowed many of  us to find the reasons behind
our current difficulties through a new and better understanding of
the other countries in our continent, within their cultures, their
troubles, their contemporary and past struggles, and the differences
between our identities and theirs …52
Chile, for the fugitives of  the Brazilian dictatorship, was a symbol of
freedom, an “El Dorado” for Brazilian exiles or “the Mecca of  the World’s
Left”.53 The political changes that Chile was going through attracted their inter-
est and attention. It was the place to be to learn what the other America, the
Hispanic America was about. This was the case of  Márcio Moreira Alves, a
young prominent opponent to the dictatorship, known for having denounced
torture and written a book about torture in Brazil. He escaped to Chile where he
was convinced by a former minister of  João Goulart to stay in the country to
learn about Latin America. Moreira Alves recalls that this former Minister told
him: 
“You know nothing about Latin America. If  you stay a year or so you
will learn about Latin America, and then you can go to Europe” … So I
[Moreira Alves] did what I needed to do, was convinced about the impor-
tance of  Hispanic America, and I stayed in Chile a year and a half.54
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For many exiles Chile was the example that revolution could be done in
a democratic setting. After September 11 1973, however, that would change. The
brutal repression that followed affected both Chileans and foreigners, since the
latter were considered Marxist infiltrators. Among them were many Brazilian
exiles.55 For a second or third time the Brazilians had to leave, although this time
was the worst.56 Their dreams of  a successful revolution were shattered, they
were detained by soldiers in concentration camps, they sought asylum in
embassies, they were taken out of  the country with the help of  diplomats and
employees of  international organizations, and finally for some they arrived to a
new exile mostly in Europe for the remaining eight or ten years. Their native
country, however, did not help them. The Brazilian ambassador to Chile, Câmara
Canto, was nicknamed the fifth member of  the Junta, due to the aid he provided
to the four members of  the Chilean Junta in securing loans and in detaining
Brazilian exiles residing in Chile. As the night of  the dictatorship settled in Chile,
many Chileans were beginning to suffer the same destiny as the Brazilians they
had hosted; they would have to leave the country for a good part of  the seven-
teen years of  the Chilean dictatorship.57
The Chilean Case: The Road to a Renewed Left
Although there was some sense that a military coup was being prepared and
would happen soon, the Chilean government under Allende was never prepared
to defend itself. Allende, in his last speech on the morning of  September 11
1973, mentioned that he would not surrender, but never called for an armed
defense of  the government. On the one hand, it seemed there was hope that the
strong constitutional doctrine of  the Chilean armed forces would stop a military
coup. On the other, the coup was extremely well orchestrated especially by the
Navy where detentions and torture of  leftist sailors began as early as 1972, pre-
senting no opportunity for possible counterattacks by ill-armed factory workers.
On a similar note, the strong verticality of  command of  the Chilean armed
forces prevented any possibility of  opposition from within.58
As in the case of  Brazil, the Chilean coup was a reaction by local mili-
tary and right-wing parties to the possibility of  the country following a socialist
revolutionary process. Unlike the Brazilian case where the US sent a navy and
marine detachment to aid the Brazilian military in case of  need, the Chilean
coup was not directly supported by the United States. Regardless of  this, the
Chilean political process that began in 1958 with the election of  Alessandri
(1958-1934), continued during Frei’s government (1964-1970), and ended with
the September 11, 1973 coup was directly and indirectly influenced by the
United States. During this fifteen-year period, Chile was successively governed by
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a right-wing coalition with Alessandri; a center coalition with Frei; and a left-
wing coalition with Allende. Each coalition had at the time close to 33 percent of
the votes; hence, this period is now known as the period of  the “three thirds”
and was marked by increasing political polarization of  Chilean society, and pro-
found political, social, and economic changes in the nation. 
Allende’s government expanded the social reforms begun during the
previous two governments. During his rule, he completed the nationalization of
the copper mines, until then in the hands of  US companies, increased the scope
of  the land-reform program and directly or indirectly nationalized several indus-
tries. This process enraged the higher classes and right-wing parties, and also
complicated relationships with some of  the professional and middle classes, as
well as with their main political preference, the Christian Democrat party. At the
same time the United States, fearing the establishment of  a new Cuba on the
American continent, began a destabilization policy on the day that Allende was
elected that included denial of  loans to fix and replace machinery used in copper
production, financing of  right wing terrorism, and initiation of  contacts with
conservative groups and pro-right military to create a situation that would lead to
a military takeover.59 These external influences, along with internal strikes and
sabotages by right wing groups, influenced social unrest and macroeconomic cri-
sis that produced the conditions for a military coup.60
Unlike the case of  Brazil, the repression of  the supporters of  Allende’s
government began immediately and was more severe. The great majority of  tor-
tures, summary killings and disappearances happened between 1973 and 1978.
The estimates for the first two years are between 20,000 to 30,000 exiles; 80,000
political prisoners; and deaths ranging from a conservative calculation of  3,000
to a high estimate of  30,000.61 The leadership of  the political parties that
formed the governing coalition under Allende (namely the Socialist, Communist
and other smaller parties) were completely disarticulated and their members were
either killed, disappeared or exiled. Only six months after the coup, in March of
1974, the military government declared, “…the armed forces do not set timeta-
bles for their management of  the government, because the task of  rebuilding the
country morally, institutionally, and economically requires prolonged and pro-
found actions”.62 According to Wright and Oñate, this rebuilding involved the
“extirpation of  Marxism and its doctrine of  class struggle and their replacement
with the values of  conservative Catholicism, class harmony, and Chilean nation-
alism.”63
The Chilean exile followed several paths abroad. During the first month
following the coup a significant number of  Chileans, composed mostly of  the
political elite of  the government that had survived the coup and avoided the first
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waves of  detentions, asked for diplomatic asylum in many embassies. They were
joined there by mid-level political activists and by foreigners, as we have seen in
the case of  Brazilians. In the years that followed the coup, many other Chileans
that had been detained in concentration camps were expelled from the country.64
Norambuena estimates that close to 76 percent of  the exiles left the country
with their families; 52 percent left Chile between 1973 and 1976; 16.3 percent
between 1977 and 1980; and close to 10 percent between 1980 and 1984.65 This
last group was comprised also of  economic exiles that, due to their political
beliefs, had no opportunity to get a job in Chile. Norambuena also stresses that
psychological problems were common among the exiles, with higher than nor-
mal proportions of  alcoholism and depression.66 There are at least 12 docu-
mented cases of  exiles committing suicide while living abroad, a phenomenon
that is also present in the Brazilian case.67
As in the Brazilian case, the renovation of  the Chilean left began in the
embassies. This change came with the debate over the reasons for the defeat.
Allende formed his coalition, the Unidad Popular (UP), from two main parties, the
Socialist and the Communist, and a set of  smaller groups and parties such as the
MAPU (Popular Unitary Action Movement), a faction of  the Radical Party, and
the Christian Left, among others. Within the left but somewhat outside of  the
UP was an insurrectional movement, the MIR or Revolutionary Left Movement.
By 1973 Allende’s coalition was completely divided in terms of  how to confront
the de facto blockade of  the United States, the right, and the Christian Democrats,
and how to continue and expand the socialist revolution. Two main visions
clashed within the coalition. On the one side, the Communist Party wanted to
continue a democratic revolution even at the expense of  negotiating with the
Christian Democrats. The Socialists and the MIR on the other wanted a more
radical revolution, even arming themselves as a defense against a coup that they
anticipated. At the time of  the coup, the MIR decided to stay in Chile and mili-
tarily confront the dictatorship while the leaderships of  the socialists and the
communists, as well as the other smaller parties, sought refuge in embassies.68
Discussions of  who should be blamed (United States’ imperialism,
communists or socialists) for the defeat of  the revolutionary process led to self-
questioning about the state of  the Left in the world.69 These discussions were
bitter and led to continuous cross-accusations about who carried the most
blame. The communists argued that it was the socialists’ and MIR’s fault because
of  their lack of  understanding of  the Chilean process. The socialists argued that
it was the communists’ fault and their lack of  revolutionary zeal but more gener-
ally that “the left had not been sufficiently Leninist”.70 The MIR argued that the
fault lay with the idea of  developed reformist politics at a time when conditions
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were ripe for the revolution.71 In the words of  a Brazilian exiled in Chile: 
The truth is that the Chilean experience kept going around my
head. The amount of  mistakes made by the left, and particularly by
the far left, made it intolerable to reconcile with a foolish radicalism.
I was ready to write a book on the Chilean coup opposing the the-
ses defended by the left. Without exceptions, all the politicians that
fought in Chile, socialists, communists, or from other leftist parties,
argue that the factor responsible for the fall of  the government was
the United States’ imperialism. Almost none of  them would men-
tion the significant contribution that the left made with its own mis-
takes, its arrogance, its naïveté, and its own stupidity.72
These traumatic life experiences, the fall of  Allende, the coup and its
share of  murder, imprisonment and exile, were the “catalysts for ideological and
role transformation”.73 The experience of  exile became a political renovation in
many cases. There were numerous multiparty conferences to attempt to explain
the defeat and to decide the best way to end the military government.74 There
were differences, however, among those who belonged to the political appa-
ratchik and other thinkers and scholars from the left. The party loyalists contin-
ued participating in politics as, “virtually an extension of  party politics conduct-
ed in another fashion … [which] seemed to have had little effect on their politi-
cal ideologies.”75 For the intellectuals and scholars from the left, on the other
hand:
[E]xile allowed them to reflect a good deal on past position and to
be engaged in networks of  international debate that lent distance
and perspective to the Allende period, to internal party politics, and
to socialism as theory and praxis.76
Puryear and Wright share this point. Puryear argues that the possibility
of  meeting with other intellectuals in Europe, the development of  networks,
think-tanks such as the Institute for the New Chile and the journal Chile-America
were key in the process of  re-constructing and re-thinking the role of  the left in
a democratic Chile.77 Wright argues that “[E]xposure to politics in super-devel-
oped social democracies, the decline of  statism within the Western European
Left, and (for some) living in socialist countries all had profound effects on the
exiles.”78 This created a profound gap between the former allies (communists
and socialists) and within the parties themselves. Shortly after the death and dis-
appearance of  their leadership in the country, both parties began to move away
from their pre-coup positions and to develop new strategies.79 While an impor-
tant group of  socialists became more moderate and switched to the center, the
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Communist Party supported a military insurrection against the dictatorship, an
effort that was defeated, thereby reducing the influence of  this party in Chilean
politics. Other former communists, having the experience of  living in countries
of  the communist bloc, were disappointed by the lack of  freedom within these
countries. An important number of  these leaders left the Communist Party and
moved to the Socialist Party presenting themselves more as Euro-communists
than as Soviet communists. As Hite argues by citing Antonio Leal:
Between my contact with the PCI (Italian Communist Party) and
my link with the PCCH (Chilean Communist Party) youth … it
meant that already by the late 1970s the majority of  us on the
Central Committee, at least the Executive Committee of  the Jota,
understood that the world had changed radically, that the socialist
bloc had serious defects, that there couldn’t be democracy without
human rights.80
The Socialist Party had always been a party of  divisions; it had a “loose-
ly structured party organization”.81 This process was only accentuated once
abroad, where the many factions split into a continuum in which Marxist social-
ism and Western European social democracy were the extremes. The latter
moved to the center of  the political spectrum and joined Radicals and Christian
Democrats to establish the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, a political con-
glomerate that had the role of  negotiating the democratic transition and was in
power until 2010. Many of  the former exiles that belonged to the elites have had
cabinet positions in the four governments of  this coalition (two of  the last five
presidents have been former exiles, as is the current general secretary of  the
Organization of  American States). This coalition has also had the role of  creat-
ing means to learn the truth of  what happened during the dictatorship, and cre-
ated in 1990 the Oficina Nacional del Retorno (National Office for the Return of
Exiles) whose objective was to properly bring back those who had left the coun-
try.82
Not all exiles agreed with this movement to the center, or at least with
the reasons behind the renovation. Some felt that the renovation was something
done by elites, not taking into consideration the sentiments of  middle level party
members or even those who worked for Allende and the government outside of
Santiago. Alejandro was a member of  the Socialist party in the far south of  Chile
and currently is an exile living in Chicago. At the time of  the coup he was in
charge of  the state-run tourism office in Punta Arenas. He was detained,
tortured, sent to prison in a concentration camp at Dawson Island, relegated to
Chiloé, and in 1975 received a change of  his sentence to exile in the United
States. In an interview he told me: 
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The people that went to Europe brought [to Chile] new ideas, or
changed their radical ideas for … well reality also changed them a lot,
but they became renovated, then it does not exist anymore, I dare to
say that they are not leftist anymore, I mean it is a huge frustration,
not only for me, but for my entire generation.83
Unintended Consequences and Human Rights
The consequences of  the military dictatorships for these countries were enor-
mous. Beyond the number of  deaths, torture victims, disappearances, and exiles,
they produced massive changes to the relations between the state, civil society,
and political parties; to the relations between the economy and society; and to
the culture of  the nation.84 As I have shown here, exile also meant, for
Brazilians, the discovery of  their belonging to Latin America and, for Chileans,
the renovation of  the left.
The discovery of  a Latin American identity can be exemplified by the
changes in Brazil’s foreign policy in the last 25 years. Historically, Brazil has con-
sistently defined itself  as a regional power. Its position, with its most important
cities looking towards the Atlantic, defined the characteristics of  its foreign rela-
tions. While the foreign policy would not change until the return of  the former
exiles to power in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was during the dictatorship
years that Brazilian intellectuals from the left began to feel part of  Latin
America. According to Bethell this was “often directly a consequence of  years
spent in exile during the Brazilian military dictatorship in Uruguay (until the
coup there in 1973), Chile (until the coup against Allende, also in 1973), Mexico
and Venezuela”.85 After the return to democracy in 1985, Brazil pushed for a
stronger integration with Latin America and in particular with South America.
The political decision to form MERCOSUR, leaving behind decades of  animosi-
ties with Argentina is one of  these changes.86
These processes of  integration became even more relevant during the
governments of  Cardoso, himself  an exile in Chile in 1965, and Lula.87 Cardoso
hosted a meeting of  South American presidents in 2000, and under Lula’s leader-
ship the South American Community of  Nations was formed in 2004. Cardoso
defined the 2000 meeting as “a reaffirmation of  South America’s own identity as
a region”.88 Brazil no longer has its back to the other Latin American countries,
but has turned towards them. This was mostly the result of  the exiles who left
Brazil to discover Latin America in the late 1960s. 
The Chilean return to democracy in the late 1990s has been considered
one of  the most peaceful and successful democratic transitions in recent history.
This transition did not occur without strong compromises and fears.89 The left,
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in particular the Socialist Party, had to learn through the death of  hundreds of
its members that their intransigent undemocratic position during Allende’s gov-
ernment did not make it possible to regain power and win election in a country
such as Chile that prides itself  as being historically the most democratic of  the
region.90 This meant a turn to a more pragmatic approach to politics.91 It also
meant giving concessions to other parties in order to remain in power. Finally,
the struggle against dictatorship and life in the Eastern Bloc countries meant a
“…reevaluation of  democracy and the refutation of  authoritarian rule” which
ruled out the possibility of  a dictatorship of  the proletariat, which had been one
of  the objectives of  the 1970-1973 Socialist Party.92 This rejection of  revolution,
according to Puryear, and its exchange for democratic reform “meant seeking
the creation of  democratic national culture rather than an emancipatory project
geared toward a particular social sector.93
The benefits of  these unintended consequences, the increased partici-
pation in Latin America by Brazil and the successful democratic transition of
Chile, do not negate the fact that the dictatorships, which ruled these countries,
were machines of  terror. The exile of  the 1960s and 1970s intended to remove
and eliminate generations that were against the project of  the military regimes, a
project that defined a particular economic and political order. In this sense it
belongs to the same level of  human rights abuses and corresponds to the same
logic as the torture and the killings, as Rollemberg argues.94 It has not, however,
been considered in the truth commissions that have been developed in these
countries to investigate the crimes of  the dictatorships. So far, in the case of
Brazil, the truth commission set by the Archdiocese of  São Paulo, and not by
the government, deals with torture and disappearances and not with exile.95
The new Comissão Nacional da Verdade established by the government of
Dilma Rousseff  and approved on September 21 2011, while dealing with torture,
murders and disappearances both inside and outside of  Brazil, does not incorpo-
rate exile as a human rights abuse.96 In the case of  Chile, although there was a
policy to help return Chilean exiles by giving them tax breaks, helping them
finance housing, and allowing the recognition of  education from other countries,
the process of  exile has not been present in any of  the truth commissions set by
the democratic governments since 1990.97
A possible explanation of  the dismissal of  exile, accepted by many who
stayed in the countries during the dictatorships, is that exile is not a matter of
human rights; after all, they are still alive. They did not suffer the repression, did
not see the disappeared or tortured, and did not suffer the fears of  the state of
siege. Except for those expelled from the country, most exiles left Chile with
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their passports and on regularly scheduled flights; this was used to ground the
propaganda against exiles as people who left because they wanted to leave. While
many suffered economic and social hardships, Pinochet’s government used the
higher levels of  income and education achieved by some to discredit the plights
of  the exiles.98 These arguments were based on the propaganda by both dicta-
torships that exiles were traitors to their nations who were living a “golden exile”
or “jet set” lifestyle in Europe funded by their political parties.99 As the personal
narratives cited in this paper attest for both Chilean and Brazilian cases, however,
it is possible to observe the deep disruption that the experience of  exile had for
both individuals and families.
This is also present in the literature that refers explicitly to the process
of  return. They had a hard return to a new country, and the recognition that for
many they were simply away, as if  they were on holiday and not affected by the
dictatorship. As Pablo Yankelevich argues for the case of  Argentina,
[E]veryone who returned during the first few years after the end of  the
dictatorship felt the weight of  that emblematic and condemning phrase,
‘it was because of  something’ with which parts of  the society badly hid
the complaisant silence with the criminal policies of  the Argentinean
Armed forces.”100
Almost thirty years have passed since the end of  the last dictatorship of
the Southern Cone. It is time to re-evaluate the place of  exile as a human rights
abuse. It is also time to encourage the development of  more research on the
effects of  exile, not only at the individual level, but also at the macro level. I
have presented here only two possible, albeit critical, non-anticipated conse-
quences of  the processes of  exile: the “discovery” of  Latin America by
Brazilians and the reform and renovation of  the Chilean left. There are multiple
others in the individual narratives: tales of  heroism and of  sorrow, of  conquer
and defeat, and above all of  remembrance of  those who died.
There is also a growing and extremely interesting literature on the gen-
der worlds of  Southern Cone exile.101 It tells stories of  women that were aban-
doned by their partners, or who were relegated to secondary positions in the sol-
idarity movements abroad after being leaders in their countries. We do not, how-
ever, have extensive research on the impact of  the exiles in their countries of
reception, and even less in their countries of  origin. Close to three decades later,
we do not know how many children of  exiles went back to the countries of  their
parents and remained there. We have only started to scratch the surface of  this
topic, and a thorough analysis of  these processes is a key component in the dis-
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cussions of  memory, reconciliation, and the re-constructions of  these nations,
since those who were exiled and never returned, the children who stayed in the
countries of  asylum, and the foreign partners who came back will always be part
of  these nations. In the words of  Mónica Palma Mora: 
Exile, once it begins, never ends. The returnee, even glad of  return,
continues living in two worlds. The nostalgia that wanted to heal by returning to
their native land, their people, and their dreams becomes nostalgia for those that
were left behind. That which was good of  the asylum revives always the pain of
distance. The returnee continues being an exile and always will be. 102
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38 Beatriz Bandeira Ryff, A resistẽncia: Anotaço ̃es do exi ́lio em Belgrado, (Rio de
Janeiro: Walter Duarte, 1990); Ana Montenegro, Tempo de exiílio, (Aracaju,
Sergipe: Edições Novos Rumos, 1988); Cardoso, The Accidental President of  Brazil,
Pinheiro Machado, Os exilados; Rabêlo and Rabêlo, Diáspora: os longos caminhos do
exiílio.
39 Pablo Yankelevich, Represión y destierro itinerarios del exilio argentino, (La Plata:
Ediciones Al Margen, 2004).
40 Bandeira Ryff, 14 [my translation].
41 Montenegro.
42 Santos and Denis Rolland.
43 Cardoso, 87.
44 Denise Rollemberg, “The Brazilian Exile Experience: Remaking Identities,”
Latin American Perspectives n. 34 (2007): 81-105; Rabêlo and Rabêlo.
45 Helio Jaguaribe, “El Brasil y la América Latina,” Foro Internacional 15 no. 4
(1975): 607-637; Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, “Brasil, Estados Unidos y los
procesos de integración regional. La lógica de los pragmatismos,” Nueva
Sociedad, n. 186 (2003): 143.
46 Leslie Bethell, “Brazil and ‘Latin America’,” Journal of  Latin American Studies 42
n. 3 (2012): 457-485.
47 Rabêlo and Rabêlo, 26.
48 Rabêlo and Rabêlo, 26, 27.
Doña-Reveco32
Quark 16_2_Left History.qxd  2012-12-21  12:50 AM  Page 32
49 Carina Alejandra Black, Fernando Henrique Cardoso: Intellectual Evolution From
Exile to Presidency, (Thesis (Ph. D.) University of  Nevada, Reno, 1997), 98.
50 Montenegro Tempo de exílio, 32 [my translation].
51 Pinheiro Machado, 37.
52 Montenegro, 38 [my translation].
53 Pinheiro Machado, 95; Rabêlo and Rabêlo.
54 James N. Green, “Brazilian Exiles in the United States: A Human Right
Discourse,” in Roniger et al Exile and The Politics of  Exclusion in the Americas: 163-
182, 168.
55 Pinheiro Machado; Rabêlo and Rabêlo, 137.
56 It was a third time for those who had originally exiled themselves to
Argentina, Uruguay, or Bolivia before going to Chile.
57 Pinheiro Machado, 104; Rabêlo and Rabêlo, 159; Rollemberg, 107.
58 Correa, Figueroa and Jocelyn-Holt, Historia del siglo XX chileno, 274-276.
59 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and
Accountability, (New York: New Press: 2003), 12-28. 
60 Correa et al, 265-275.
61 Correa, et al, 287.
62 Wright and Oñate, 5.
63 Wright and Oñate, 5.
64 Norambuena, 177.
65 Norambuena, 177-178.
66 See also Vásquez-Bronfman and Araújo, 23.
67 Rabêlo and Rabêlo, 81; Rollemberg, 286.
68 Ricardo Yocelevzky, Chile, partidos políticos, democracia y dictadura 1970-1990,
(Santiago, Chile: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2002); Norma Stoltz Chinchilla
and William Bollinger, “Introduction: Theoretical Issues of  the Chilean
Experience,” Latin American Perspectives, 1 no. 2 (1974): 3-8; and Kyle Steenland,
“The Coup in Chile,” Latin American Perspectives, 1 no. 2 (1974): 9-29.
69 Wright and Oñate, 53.
70 Jeffrey Puryear, Thinking Politics: Intellectuals and Democracy in Chile, 1973-1988,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994): 61.
71 Stoltz Chinchilla and Bollinger, 5.
72 Ferreira Gullar, Rabo de foguete: os anos de exílio, (Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Editora
Revan, 1998), 226 [my translation.]
73 Katherine Hite, When The Romance Ended: Leaders of  the Chilean Left, 1968-1998,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), xvi.
The Unintended Consequences of  Exile 33
Quark 16_2_Left History.qxd  2012-12-21  12:50 AM  Page 33
74 Federico Guillermo Gil, Ricardo Lagos Escobar, and Henry A. Landsberger,
Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of  the Socialist Years, 1970-1973¸ (Philadelphia:




78 Thomas C. Wright, “Legacy of  Dictatorship: Works on the Chilean
Diaspora,” Latin American Research Review, 30 no. 3 (1995): 198; 204.
79 Kenneth M. Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements
in Chile and Peru, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998), 83.
80 Hite, 139. The Jota is the youth section of  the Chilean Communist Party. It is
named after the Spanish sounds of  the first letter in its acronym JJCC
(Juventudes Comunistas – Communist Youth).
81 Roberts, 48.
82 Wright and Rody Oñate; Norambuena; Correa, Figueroa and Jocelyn-Holt.
83 Interview with Alejandro Ferrer, Chicago January of  2011.
84 Daniel Aarão Reis, Marcelo Ridenti and Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, O golpe e a
ditadura militar quarenta anos depois (1964 – 2004), (Bauru, SP: EDUSC, 2004);
Garretón, The Chilean Political Process; and Manuel A. Garreton, La Faz sumergida
del iceberg: estudios sobre la transformación cultural, (Santiago: LOM, 1993), 128.
85 Bethell, 482.
86 According to Moniz Bandeira, Cardoso argued in 2001 that “MERCOSUR is
more than a market; is, to Brazil, its destiny”; Moniz Bandeira, “Brasil, Estados
Unidos y los procesos de integración regional”, 150.
87 Cardoso, 221.
88 Moniz Bandeira, 149.
89 Patricio Silva, “Collective Memories, Fears and Consensus: The Political
Psychology of  the Chilean Democratic Transition,” in Societies of  Fear: The Legacy
of  Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America, Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt,
(London: Zed Books, 1999), 171-196.
90 Carlos Altamirano, Dialéctica de una derrota, (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores,
1979). An interesting counterpoint to this was published by the President of  the
Chilean Senate and member of  the Socialist Party Camilo Escalona in 2010 in a
letter entitled Altamirano o el Desprecio a lo Popular. Availabe at
http://www.socialismo-chileno.org/PS/index.php?option=com_contentand-
task=viewandid=1486andItemid=48 (Accessed August 1, 2012).
Doña-Reveco34
Quark 16_2_Left History.qxd  2012-12-21  12:50 AM  Page 34
91 Eduardo Ortiz, “Chilean Socialism and Transition,” Economic and Political
Weekly, 28 no. 40, (1993): 2124-2129.
92 Patricio, Silva, Social Democracy, Neoliberalism and Ideological Change in the Chilean
Socialist Movement, 1973-1992, paper presented at the XVII International Congress
of  the Latin American Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, September
24-27, 1992, available at https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-
papers/lasa1992/files/SilvaPatricio.pdf, (Accessed August 1, 2012).
93 Puryear, 61-62.
94 Rollemberg, 281, 290.
95 cf. Joan Dassin, and Jaime Wright, Torture in Brazil: A Shocking Report on the
Pervasive use of  Torture by Brazilian Military Governments, 1964-1979, (Austin, Tex:
Institute of  Latin American Studies, University of  Texas, 1998). While this book
is an improtant source to learn about human rights abuses during the Brazilian
dictatorship, it makes no reference to exiles being a human rights abuse that the
Archiodese of  São Paulo should investigate.
96 The law that creates the Commission states in its Art. 3, number II “pro-
mover o esclarecimento circunstanciado dos casos de torturas, mortes, desa-
parecimentos forçados, ocultação de cadáveres e sua autoria, ainda que ocorridos
no exterior;” available at http://www.cnv.gov.br/ (Accessed on October 2, 2012).
97 These were The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report of
1991 (the Rettig Report) which dealt with political assassinations, and The
National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report of  2004
(the Valech Report), which obviously dealt with torture.
98 Rebolledo.
99 Rebolledo, 16; Wright & Oñate, 149; and Thomas C. Wright and Rody Oñate,
“Chilean Political Exile,” in Exile and the politics of  exclusion in the Americas, Luis
Roniger, James Naylor Green, and Pablo Yankelevich (eds), (Eastbourne: Sussex
Academic Press, 2012): 145-62, 146.
100 Yankelevich, Represion y destierro itinerarios del exilio argentino, 10 [my translation].
101 Shayne, They Used to Call us Witches; Association Participa (Lille), Femmes
Chiliennes en Exil; Albertina Costa, Memórias das mulheres do exílio: obra coletiva, (Rio
de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980).
102 Mónica Palma Mora, “Destierro y Encuentro. Aproximaciones al exilio lati-
noamericano en México 1954-1980,” Amérique Latine Histoire et Mémoire, No. 7
(2003 - Migrations Etats-Unis Mexique terre d'accueil), http://alhim.revues.org/docu-
ment363.html (accesed August 2, 2008), 18.
The Unintended Consequences of  Exile 35
Quark 16_2_Left History.qxd  2012-12-21  12:50 AM  Page 35
